Home > Articles
Articles
Tale of the Tomahawk
Naval Commanders Fired At Rapid Rate
Canada’s Floating Misery
Yes, Cut Defense Budget, But Smartly
Straight Talk On Taiwan
Cold War Mindset Harms Peace
Confronting China’s Snarl
End The Monopolies In Defense Contracts
Iran's 'Special' Naval Threat Dissected
Tale of the Tomahawk by Dana Hedgpeth and William M. Arkin from Top Secret America (Washington Post) August 30
Remember Tomahawk? The low-flying missile launched from Navy cruisers, destroyers and submarines that was one of those new precision weapons of the first Gulf War and the main tool of counter-terrorism in the 1990's?
Nineteen years after its debut, the now little-used missile is still being manufactured, and that's good news for two Top Secret America contractors.
Lockheed Martin of Bethesda recently won a $16.6 million contract to continue its work on software that runs the Tomahawk. The deal could be worth $50.7 million if all four-option years are used.
As part of the contract, Lockheed said it would "provide systems engineering, software development, hardware support and management required to continue the system upgrades to address significant hardware, software and interoperability obsolescence issues."
Translation: its software computes the missile's route to strike targets.
Lockheed's been working on the Tomahawk program since 1999. As for the actual missile -- that's made by Raytheon. Earlier this year, Raytheon received $202.7 million to produce nearly 200 Tomahawks. Raytheon provided this promotional video (wmv) of its Tomahawk missile.
Why continue to build long-range cruise missiles in an era of "boots on the ground," when the weapon of choice these days is an actual soldier with eyes on target directing an airplane overhead or a missile-shooting drone?
We asked the Navy why the Tomahawk was in still in demand. Here's what the service said in an emailed response. "The contract with Lockheed is for software development and fielding to support the functions that the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System perform," wrote a spokesperson for Mike Thumm, deputy program manager for Tomahawk Weapon Control Systems. "These include missile inventory control, processing and reporting, missile route planning, missile launch and control of the missile during its flight."
John Pike, a defense industry expert at GlobalSecurity.org, says the answer lies in possible future engagements: "We want to continue to be prepared to blow up China, Iran or North Korea or any other country that may need blowing up."
Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld testified before Congress in 2002 about converting four retiring Cold War submarines into Tomahawk shooting machines. Rumsfeld said the conversion represented "an emerging portfolio of transformational capabilities that should enable us to defend freedom in the dangerous century ahead."
The so-called "SSGN" conversion program, a multi-million dollar endeavor, is now complete and its showcase -- and little-used -- missile lives on.
Naval Commanders Fired At Rapid Rate
(SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE 27 AUG 10) ... Jeanette Steele
The Navy has fired 13 commanding officers so far this year, as senior sailors make career-ending mistakes at a pace that will produce one of the decade’s biggest years for being “relieved of command.”
The advent of electronic communication has made it easier to catch personal indiscretions, the Navy says, and modern social norms mean there are more rules to trip over these days.
But still there’s no real explanation for why so many seasoned officers are committing errors that usually force them into unplanned retirement, and can even get them kicked out of the Navy.
Among the latest was the skipper of the San Diego-based Peleliu, Capt. David Schnell, who was relieved of duty Aug. 15 with a sparse statement from the Navy saying his boss had “lost confidence in his ability to command” because of “unduly familiar” behavior with the crew.
Another firing came Aug. 21, when the Navy ousted Cmdr. Mary Ann Giese from command of the U.S. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station in Bahrain.
Former and current Navy leaders insist the process, which usually provides few details about what the ousted officer did wrong, is fair and that removals as a percentage of all commanders is low, at 1 percent.
They say the performance expectations for commanders, especially at sea, is just extremely high — and needs to be.
Chief of Naval Operations Gary Roughead said Thursday that each firing bothers him. He looks at every case to see if there’s a common thread, and the Navy mulls the issue in leadership seminars.
“I do think about, ‘Is there a change? Why is there a change?’ ” Roughead said. But, he added, “You’re not going to change the standard, just because the number may be getting high.”
Of the 13 commanders fired this year, seven were removed for personal misconduct, including fraternization and inappropriate relationships. Three were removed because of mishaps at sea, such as a ship hitting a pier. But it was unclear what happened in the three remaining cases because details released were vague.
Why would someone who has devoted years to the Navy, reaching the pinnacle of a career, imperil that by engaging in sometimes sophomoric behavior — such as the captain who was arrested in January for soliciting a prostitute not far from his South Carolina base?
“Power is a funny thing,” said retired Rear Adm. Mac McLaughlin, now president of San Diego’s USS Midway Museum.
Naval officers feel the pull of it, just like politicians, he said.
“Your state in life can get to the point where you make a series of or a major mistake, that maybe without that powerful position wouldn’t have grown into your DNA,” McLaughlin said.
The Navy’s Personnel Command in Tennessee doesn’t have computerized data from before 2000, so officials couldn’t say whether the rate of firings has increased during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
For the past 10 years, the annual average has been 12 to 14 commanders relieved of their posts. The Navy saw a spike in 2003, when 26 got fired. Officials said there’s no single reason for higher numbers that year, or this one.
But Capt. Leo Falardeau, assistant commander at Navy Personnel, said people are probably getting nabbed more often for personal misconduct these days.
First, there’s e-mail. An indiscrete commander sending love notes in the office is easily discovered when the Navy searches for e-mails sent across a government computer.
Also, changing social standards mean more wires to trip over. Drinking and driving is one example. Bars on Navy bases used to be the norm, and Falardeau said it’d be naive to think everyone drove home sober.
“I think what we’re seeing is conduct that may have been, years ago, wrong like it is today, but generally speaking it was acceptable,” he said.
“The undercurrent is, some guys who get in trouble can’t figure out that we’re living in 2010. We’re not living in 1960,” Falardeau said. “You know, going out and swinging from a chandelier and raising cain is ‘what sailors do.’ It’s not what sailors do.”
He ventured a guess that nearly every commander fired 50 years ago got in trouble for running the ship aground or hitting a pier.
Falaradeau defended the Navy’s tactic of revealing little about the reasons behind many firings.
In Schnell’s case, the public was left to guess what “unduly familiar” behavior meant, and many commenters on this newspaper’s website speculated it was a romantic relationship. However, it could mean a commander unfairly favored one sailor over another.
Current and past Navy leaders said fired officers have a right to some privacy about the details and called the investigation process painstaking.
Schnell declined to be interviewed.
The ousted commander is usually allowed to quietly retire. In some cases, the Navy forces the officer to prove why he or she should stay in uniform.
Since 2006, eight former commanders have gone before an inquiry board; five were allowed to stay.
Being in command is a pressure-cooker situation, and there’s a joke in Navy circles. The best days of a command are the first day on the job — and the last day, if the Navy band plays.
“If you depart earlier than you should, the Navy band doesn’t show up,” McLaughlin said.
Still, taking a command is the dream of nearly every young ensign.
“If you go to sea as a line officer, your ultimate goal is not to become an admiral,” said retired Vice Adm. John Morgan. “Your ultimate goal is to become a commanding officer.”
Canada’s Floating Misery
Our navy is limping along as challenges on the open seas grow
(TORONTO SUN 29 AUG 10) ... Mercedes Stephenson
In 2006, the American navy experienced the shock of a lifetime when a Chinese submarine surfaced within torpedo range of the USS Kitty Hawk, an aircraft carrier.
The Americans were dumbfounded. They failed to detect the sub’s presence before it popped up in the middle of a carrier battle group, something that should be impossible. It was a bold and deliberate message from China about their new-found military capability in the Pacific.
And that was four years ago.
As a rising superpower, China has increased both the geography of its national interests and its ability to defend them.
This week, China revealed it had taken its claim to the South China Sea one step further, planting a flag beneath the water. This should make for interesting times since the Americans classify it a key U.S. national security interest.
The Chinese have backed their expanding claims with increased military spending, the largest chunk of which has gone toward their navy and, in particular, offensive capabilities like nuclear submarines.
The result has been skyrocketing military spending in the region as China’s allies benefit from new ports and weapons, while nervous neighbours pour their own national treasure into stronger navies to counter Chinese dominance.
The area around the Pacific Ocean has experienced the greatest acceleration of defence spending worldwide. It has some analysts wondering if this is the start of a Pacific arms race.
Just ask the South Koreans who had one of their warships sunk this year by a North Korean mini-sub.
Naval hijinks and future challenges are not limited to state-based arms races. The open nature of the high seas has made it an inviting way for criminals and terrorists to send a variety of chilling goods.
From the merely illegal domain of boatloads of cocaine, to the morally bankrupt trafficking of human beings, to pirates hijacking cruise ships and holding pensioners hostage for millions of dollars, to the extraordinarily dangerous shipments of illegal arms, including nuclear components, there’s no question the ability to patrol sea lanes and interdict activities which threaten security are directly in Canadian interests and in keeping with the priorities of maintaining national sovereignty and international peace and security.
More than 90% of global trade moves over the ocean. Approximately three-quarters of Canada’s gross domestic product is reliant on trade.
An increasing amount comes from the Pacific and it’s in Canada’s vital national interests to ensure the peaceful, open flow of goods over the world’s oceans, which is why Canada has historically maintained a strong naval presence.
Yet at this critical time, Canada’s navy is seeing its operational capacity declining.
In a few short years our destroyers will be taken out of service. They have simply worn out. Even if we move ahead with reconfigured frigates, they will not be able to fully replace the loss of the destroyers.
The resulting reduction in command-and-control and area air defence protective capability will limit our options.
Canada will no longer be a candidate to command multinational, allied fleets – the very type that we deploy with to conduct important international missions from counter-terrorism fleets like Task Force 150, which Canada commanded in 2008, to fighting pirates in the Gulf of Aden.
Before the destroyers age out, the navy will lose the ability to resupply itself with HMCS Protecteur and Preserver limping along. Canada will either be forced to stay home, play rent-a-ship (and hope the contractors don’t take off if things get messy), or rely on our allies to tolerate constant naval mooching.
Canada is a tri-coastal nation with strong maritime interests, yet by 2017 we could have as few as three frigates available to sail as the ships go through a mid-life extension and refit.
Canada simply cannot afford to have just a coastal navy; we must have a blue water fleet capable of representing an independent foreign policy whether it’s in support of our allies, delivering humanitarian aid, interdicting drugs, or engaging emerging powers in confidence-building exercises.
Too much of our security and our economic well-being relies directly on the world’s oceans to allow our naval capabilities to drown in a sea of ignorance.
Yes, Cut Defense Budget, But Smartly
(SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE 20 AUG 10) ... Duncan D. Hunter
There are only a few expenditures by the federal government that match the importance of investing in a strong national defense. Even in the emerging era of budget discipline, adhering to the principle of fiscal responsibility is possible without impairing security, as long as the objective is to streamline and not arbitrarily cut defense spending.
With the national debt now exceeding $13 trillion, all areas of government must be analyzed to achieve more efficiency and eliminate waste. But so far, among all of the president’s department heads, only Defense Secretary Robert Gates has offered proposals to cut spending, which include eliminating the Joint Forces Command and trimming the Pentagon’s top-heavy management structure. These might be good recommendations, but we cannot be too quick to cut defense spending without first considering its implications.
The predominant concern is with the Pentagon’s search for cost savings in areas of production that favor fighting smaller conflicts typified by Iraq and Afghanistan. That’s a dangerous proposition with potentially severe consequences. Our experience in the years following the Cold War proves that such a scenario is detrimental to readiness and security.
According to the bipartisan Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel tasked to review the Pentagon’s own strategic assessments, America’s military is inadequately preparing for emerging threats, particularly in Asia, and losing ability to project force worldwide. This warning should be taken seriously and weighed heavily against any attempt to categorically cut defense spending.
The panel, which just recently provided its critique to Congress, concluded that a “train wreck” will occur unless the defense budget is reordered and increased. It further identified a “significant and growing gap between the force structure of the military – its size and its inventory of equipment – and the missions it will be called on to perform in the future,” citing escalating aerospace and maritime shortfalls.
Analyzing the size of the Navy, the panel recommended building a fleet of 346 ships, a substantial increase from the current fleet of 282 ships and even higher than the Navy’s goal of 313 ships. The challenge in this case squares with the fact that the Navy does not have a coherent shipbuilding plan, despite the obvious need to close the growing production gap, as well as the perspective emerging from within the Pentagon that the composition of carrier strike groups already in place is too much.
In light of the Quadrennial Defense Review panel’s report, there’s no question that the current shipbuilding plan should be recalculated. Doing so would not only strengthen the Navy’s ability to project force. It’s also one of the best forms of economic stimulus and job creation.
Ship construction and repair facilities are located in many areas of the country, including Virginia, Mississippi and, of course, San Diego, which is also a principal homeport of the naval fleet. That distinction helps San Diego attract some of the most innovative businesses that directly support the military community. Adding more ships would create jobs and help boost local economies.
The same goes for the aerospace industry. Many of the unmanned aerial vehicles utilized in Afghanistan are manufactured in San Diego, while plenty of other companies that hire local workers are involved in building auxiliary aerospace components.
In San Diego alone, defense spending amounts to $26 billion in economic activity and provides 328,080 jobs, underscoring the importance of the military’s relationship with the regional economy and workforce. The same benefits are evident in other communities too. There are few better ways to create jobs than to invest in national defense.
In today’s world, there is no shortage of security challenges. North Korea and Iran are working to develop nuclear weapons. China’s military is growing at an alarming rate, giving rise to the importance of maintaining conventional assets and capability. These threats are too serious to ignore but as we fail to properly fund our defense forces, we do exactly that. And in the process, communities like San Diego lose most.
What must be avoided is any situation where the defense budget is treated the same way it was at the end of the Cold War, making us underprepared and incapable of responding to certain threats. A “peace dividend” didn’t work then and it won’t work to our advantage now.
The next step in this process involves Congress and its obligation to determine annual defense spending. Gates’ recommendations offer a good starting point and each proposed cut deserves consideration on the basis of impact to readiness, jobs and other factors. But, even then, our national security interests must always come first.
We can have a more efficient defense budget while also providing added investment to strengthen the defense base and adequately prepare for future threats. Any attempt to further undermine our ability to protect American security must be prevented at all cost.
Hunter, a Republican, represents the 52nd Congressional District, covering eastern and northern San Diego County.
Straight Talk On Taiwan
The value of 'strategic ambiguity' has run its course. As long as China believes the U.S. will abandon democratic Taiwan to avoid going to war, the danger of conflict increases.
(LOS ANGELES TIMES 20 AUG 10) ... Joseph A. Bosco
In August 1995 and March 1996, China fired missiles across the Taiwan Strait, closing it to international commerce.
On both occasions, President Clinton sent aircraft carriers to deter Chinese escalation, the first time directly through the Taiwan Strait. China condemned this "violation" of its sovereignty (just as it now objects to planned U.S.-South Korea naval exercises in the Yellow Sea) and threatened "a sea of fire" for the next battle group entering the strait.
The ships stayed out, China stopped firing missiles, and the crisis dissipated.
That time.
Fast-forward to a just-released Defense Department assessment that describes China's continuing military buildup and its potential to enforce territorial claims on Taiwan, in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.
The anti-Western hostility and paranoia of Chairman Mao's years have resurfaced in fresh charges of U.S. "containment" and "encirclement" of China. But now that sense of grievance and resentment is backed by the massive economic and military power the West helped China build.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has openly questioned Beijing's defiant approach to international norms. And Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated: "I have moved from being curious about what [the Chinese] are doing to being concerned about what they are doing."
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton correctly warned Beijing against cutting off freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The Obama administration worries that Beijing is defining its claims there as "core interests" on a par with Tibet and Taiwan, and if unchallenged, that could lead to dangerous Chinese adventurism.
Yet, on the Taiwan flashpoint, President Obama's team has unwisely perpetuated the policy of "strategic ambiguity" followed by every administration since Richard Nixon's.
Under that policy, Washington periodically sells Taipei weapons for minimal self-defense against an overwhelming Chinese attack. But Washington does not commit the United States to intervene, or not to intervene. We rely on American unpredictability to stay Beijing's hand.
The missile incidents of the mid-1990s were the closest the U.S. and China had come to open conflict since the Korean War.
At the time, Chinese military officials asked Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Nye how the U.S. would respond if China were to attack Taiwan.
He replied: "We don't know and you don't know. It would depend on the circumstances."
U.S. officials have repeated that mantra ever since, while Chinese generals have twice suggested that a U.S. defense of Taiwan could result in nuclear war reaching the American mainland.
Beyond harsh rhetoric, China further shaped the circumstances for a future Taiwan confrontation by acquiring more submarines and anti-ship missiles that could sink an aircraft carrier steaming anywhere near Taiwan. The Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review confirms the strategy's success in complicating U.S. planning.
Both countries now prepare for war in a classic deterrence/counter-deterrence dynamic, a formula for catastrophic mutual miscalculation.
Neither Beijing nor Washington wants war, but as long as China believes the U.S. will ultimately abandon democratic Taiwan to avoid it, the danger of conflict increases.
It is time for U.S. clarity on Taiwan; strategic ambiguity has run its course.
Washington should declare that we would defend democratic Taiwan against any Chinese attack or coercion, and that we also welcome Taiwan's participation in international organizations (starting by inviting President Ma Ying-jeou to Honolulu for the December meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group).
In return, Taiwan must forgo formal independence for now, even though that result is ultimately consistent with American values.
In exchange for China's renouncing force, Washington should also pledge not to recognize formal Taiwan statehood and discourage others from doing so, while also insisting that China's use of force would trigger instant recognition.
Finally, Clinton should reconsider her reluctance to challenge China's sorry human rights record. A more principled stand in support of Chinese democracy is the best long-term solution to the cross-strait conundrum. Two democratic peoples could peacefully manage the question of unification, independence or association. There would be no intractable Taiwan problem if there were no enduring Communist China problem.
Joseph A. Bosco, a national security consultant, specialized in China-Taiwan-U.S. relations at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. He worked for the China desk in Asia- Pacific Security Affairs at the office of the secretary of Defense.
Cold War Mindset Harms Peace
The US should refrain from provoking China through unnecessary military drills and respect its maritime concerns
(CHINAL DAILY 13 AUG 10) ... Yang Yi
The recent decision by the United States to involve its nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington in the scheduled joint naval drills with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the Yellow Sea will further compromise its security strategy in East Asia.
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said last Thursday that the Japan-based vessel would participate in the exercise although he did not provide the exact dates. If so, this would be a fresh provocation following a series of joint US-ROK activities that have caused tensions in East Asia.
Washington has held intensive military exercises with allies in the Pacific Ocean and Northeast and Southeast Asia over the past months, quite close to China and its surrounding region. Despite its routine military drills with certain countries in the region in previous years, the US-led exercises this year have drawn more concerns among regional members because of the unequivocal motive behind the exercises and the sensitivity of their locations.
At a superficial level, the latest US-ROK military drill is being targeted at the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for its alleged torpedoing of the ROK warship Cheonan in March that caused the deaths of 46 ROK sailors.
By conducting this joint maneuver with the US, the ROK is attempting to maintain high-pressure over the DPRK. At the same time, the US has also exposed its intention, using the exercises as a pretext to express its dissatisfaction toward Pyongyang and to show its military strength.
The large-scale military exercise is intended to send an unambiguous message to other regional countries, including China, that the US is still the strongest military power in the world and that Washington’s military dominance in Northeast Asia, and the wider Asia-Pacific region, cannot be challenged.
Pentagon’s announcement of the joint military exercise essentially sends an unspoken message to the outside world that the US is capable of doing whatever it wants in the region and will certainly do it.
The Chinese government has repeatedly expressed its concerns over the US move through various channels. The Chinese people have also expressed their indignation at the drills.
As the world’s sole superpower with an unchallenged armed force, no single nation in the world can stop the US from conducting such activity, but Washington will inevitably pay a costly price for its muddled decision.
Washington’s show of military strength by mobilizing a fleet comprising a nuclear-fuelled aircraft carrier and other warships close to China’s maritime border obviously contravenes the consensus that heads of both nations had reached on an “all-round, active and constructive” partnership.
Offending Chinese people is not in the fundamental interest of the US. Any activity aimed at pushing a country with a 1.3-billion populace with enormous potential would be inadvisable.
When the long-established global strategic pattern changes to the US’ disadvantage, Washington’s adherence to the Cold War mentality and its excessive dependence on military means to resolve international disputes will lead the superpower to bigger strategic setbacks.
The US’ stubborn adherence to its decision to dispatch aircraft carriers to the waters off China also exhibits the intractable “security dilemma” as far as bilateral ties are concerned. If this is not eliminated, it will be unfavorable to regional peace, security and prosperity.
How to extricate the two countries from this deep-rooted security dilemma, especially in the maritime arena, will not only determine how stable and healthy the relationship will be, but is also relevant to the stability of Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
It is up to the US to take some initiatives to change its long-established position for the sake of better bilateral ties. Washington should discard its deep-rooted Cold War mentality and concepts of maritime hegemony. It should also not consider China’s normal military buildup, especially that of its naval forces, as a challenge or threat to itself.
Any blockade or containment will fail to stop China’s military from advancing and making strides in the region, an irreversible move aimed at safeguarding its national interests and contributing to regional and world peace, security and prosperity.
The adoption of a cooperative approach to cope with the world’s common security challenges, rather than embracing zero-sum games, will help promote healthy interaction between the two countries’ military and shape stable and harmonious development of bilateral ties.
At the same time, China should continue to stick to its established national strategy of pushing for a harmonious world and not pursuing a hegemonic position in world affairs.
While maintaining its national interest, China should actively contribute to world peace and development. To ease mutual strategic and security misgivings, clear strategic exchanges between China and the US are badly needed.
China should send an unambiguous message to the US that it would not pursue maritime hegemony either in the region or globally, and that the country’s normal military development will contribute to world peace and stability.
And, on its part, the US should earnestly assume its responsibility as a superpower to pursue world peace and exercise caution and restraint in showing off military forces.
There is wide scope for mutual cooperation between the two naval forces, especially in shared efforts to deal with non-traditional security challenges, if the two powers really want to avoid confrontation.
The author is a Rear Admiral and former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University.
Confronting China’s Snarl
Beijing's truculence warrants a firm American response.
(WALL STREET JOURNAL 10 AUG 10) ... John Bolton
For years, foreign policy optimists have predicted that China's rise to superpower status would be peaceful and responsible. But recent Chinese offensives, both domestic and foreign, make this vision look increasingly naive. The Obama administration must decide whether to respond vigorously to Beijing's hostility or allow its aggressiveness to go unchecked.
China, for example, continues to modernize and expand its nuclear-capable delivery systems, even as President Obama urges Senate ratification of a treaty with Russia that would further reduce U.S. nuclear weapons and long-range conventional delivery systems. Beijing operates under no restraints whatsoever in enhancing its nuclear and ballistic missile options, while also developing new "carrier killer" cruise missiles.
On nuclear nonproliferation, China is evermore uncooperative. As Washington pushes for further economic sanctions against Iran, Beijing is distancing itself from the effort.
In part, the apparent distance stems from the Obama administration's unrealistic spin about how cooperative China and Russia were on the Security Council's recent ineffective sanctions resolution. But the truth is that China was never serious about tough sanctions. If anything, it is now likely to double down on its relationship with Iran, particularly with regard to oil and natural gas, in order to help Iran meet its domestic need for refined petroleum products.
Updated U.S. sanctions against North Korea also are not sitting well with the Chinese. In many respects, the Obama administration has taken a tougher line against Pyongyang than the Bush administration did: The State Department has cracked down hard on the North's access to international financial markets and is no longer openly hungering for negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program.
On the other hand, Mr. Obama has not made it clear that the only stable long-term solution to the problem of the North's nuclear program is the reunification of the peninsula under a democratic government. This should be an urgent priority, since Kim Jong Il's poor health brings that day of reckoning ever nearer.
Nor has the president responded strongly enough to Chinese efforts to keep U.S. warships from transiting and exercising in the Yellow Sea—something U.S. ships have a legitimate right to do. North Korea's unresolved maritime border with South Korea there is a continuing source of tension, and Pyongyang has, with tacit Chinese support, repeatedly made threats against U.S.-South Korean naval exercises.
America must be clear in word and deed that we will sail in international waters when and where we deem it advisable. These intentions must be declared openly, as well as expressed privately to China, so that all other nations understand our resolve.
American weakness on freedom of the seas is particularly dangerous given confrontational Chinese naval behavior in the South China Sea, buttressing Beijing's unjustifiable territorial claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rightly took a more confrontational stance on this issue last month when she rejected China's position, insisting that territorial rights "should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features."
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi snapped back angrily, calling her remarks an "attack" and blustering that U.S. involvement would "only make matters worse and the resolution more difficult." In fact, China ratcheted up its over-reaching territorial claims, provocatively including them among its "core interests."
Domestically, Beijing is also on the offensive, prompting even previously submissive foreign investors to fight back. Google's refusal to capitulate to Chinese interference in its search engine continues, while both European and American business interests have complained about increasing discrimination against foreigners in China's domestic markets. General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt accused Beijing of "hostility" to foreign corporations (although he subsequently walked back the accusation) and there appear to be increasing obstacles for lenders to recover on defaulted debts from Chinese firms.
China's long-awaited transition to a more democratic government isn't going anywhere. Beijing's repression of religious freedom continues unabated. And the government continues to flood Tibet and Xianxing with ethnic Han Chinese to overwhelm the "splittist" tendencies among those regions' respective indigenous populations.
Whether China's face to the world will continue to be more of a snarl than a smile remains to be seen. But its leaders cannot expect the United States and other governments to remain passive for long. "Softly, softly" is hardly the right reaction to Beijing's new belligerence, unless Mr. Obama is prepared to see it continue.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
End The Monopolies In Defense Contracts
(WASHINGTON POST 06 AUG 10) ... John Lehman
Although it pains me to say it, sometimes Congress knows better than the Pentagon -- and the fight over the Joint Strike Fighter engine is a case in point. The House voted on May 27 to preserve funding for an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, despite Defense Department and White House efforts to kill the engine. The Pentagon has sought to grant one company a $100 billion sole-source contract lasting 30 years; in other words, a monopoly on producing the engine. The House said not so fast -- and moved to ensure that there would be competition for the contract. I'm quite unused to defending Congress, but on this one the lawmakers were right.
If there is one program that desperately needs some cost controls, it's the Joint Strike Fighter program. The Defense Department informed Congress in March that the program had breached the legal limits on cost growth under the Nunn-McCurdy provision, and that it was running at least 50 percent over original estimates. The Government Accountability Office found in March that the program's F-35 Lightning II was running 50 percent over its contract costs. Given these massive overruns, it's no wonder the House insisted that the program face the discipline of competition.
The manifest power of competition has been shown again and again to drive innovation, lower costs and spur contractor responsiveness. Defense leaders in the Reagan and Clinton administrations rejected the sole-source dogma of bureaucrats and established second sources to compete for contracts on missiles, destroyers, submarines, cruisers and weaponry. In each case, competition immediately brought dramatic cost reductions that continued as long as competition was allowed.
The wisdom of competition was best demonstrated in the "Great Engine War," as the battle to install an alternate engine for the Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighters in the mid-1980s came to be known. Despite strong opposition from Air Force bureaucrats, Secretary Verne Orr became fed up with constant cost growth and repeated groundings of fighters because of flaws in their (sole-source) engines. Orr forced through the qualification of an alternative engine and contractor, and the two contractors competed thereafter.
The benefits came swiftly and have endured. Reliability, performance and fuel economy improved steadily. Engine-caused accidents dropped. By the second year of full competition, the cost per engine had dropped 20 percent. The Navy soon followed suit in choosing an alternative engine for the F-14 and reaped similar benefits.
The Air Force and the Navy worked together in the 1980s to qualify second sources for Sidewinder, Sparrow, Amraam, Maverick, Standard, Tomahawk and Harm missiles. In every case the annual split buy dramatically brought down the price of every missile. The same strategy was used for FFG-7 frigates, DDG-51 destroyers, Aegis cruisers and attack submarines. The savings brought the ships in under budget.
When Jacques Gansler, who served as undersecretary of defense for acquisitions during the Clinton administration, did a thorough study of 10 sole-source Pentagon aircraft programs and seven commercial competitively produced aircraft programs, he found that costs of the sole-source programs increased, on average, 46 percent over the life of the contract. The costs of competitive programs, in contrast, dropped an average of 15 percent.
The Joint Strike Fighter is the U.S. military's most expensive weapons program. It's too big not to get it right. So far, the Obama administration has followed the tired orthodoxy of the entrenched bureaucracy and threatened to veto any bill that doesn't preserve a $100 billion engine monopoly for one company. Congress is right to stop that. This is a 30-year decision. Do we favor competition or sole-source contracting? Only in Washington would this even be a debate.
The writer was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration and is a member of the National Defense Commission. He also served on the Sept. 11 commission.
Iran's 'Special' Naval Threat Dissected
(ASIA TIMES 06 AUG 10) ... Nima Adelkhah
When the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution on June 9 authorizing a fourth round of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its controversial nuclear program, the risk of conflict in the Persian Gulf also escalated considerably.
One of the potential points of tension is the resolution's explicit call for cargo inspection. Iran has warned vehemently against such a move. According to Brigadier Ali Fadavi, Iran's military forces, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN), maintain a "special and suitable response to the inspection of Iranian vessels".
However, a major military move to challenge this particular regime of sanctions in the Persian Gulf would probably involve an attempt to close off the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway between
Iran and Oman through which nearly 40% of crude oil supplies pass, including 88% of Saudi Arabian and 98% of Iraqi oil exports.
Since 2008, Tehran has warned bluntly of its potential to seal off the Strait of Hormuz, together with targeting US shipping, to create turmoil in the oil market with a consequent major impact on the global economy. As an Iranian analyst puts it, the Strait of Hormuz is the "hanging rope" of the American economy. But to what extent is Iran militarily capable of bringing about these tactical objectives in response to a possible US attack? Could Iran effectively close the Strait of Hormuz?
Iran's main military goal in the Persian Gulf is to exploit the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage over possible Israeli or US attacks on its nuclear facilities and Iran's air defense system, which would be the main target of the initial assault. Since Iran is fully aware of American military superiority, the key to Iranian success is not to impair of US naval forces through conventional military means, but to disrupt, dislocate and confuse the adversary in order to deter further attacks on its land-based strategic sites - nuclear or otherwise.
Defensive military operations of this sort could be effective insofar as slowing down the progress of the opposing forces and, in psychological terms, allowing Iran to claim victory by surviving a conventional military assault - similar to Hezbollah following the 33-day war with Israel in 2006.
In the event of an attack, both the Iranian navy and the IRGCN (which operates its own force of small boats in parallel with the national navy) would rely on coastal defense forces and asymmetrical warfare, with the aim of limiting the activities of US naval forces from either a far distance (with missiles) or in close proximity (using speed boats or mines).
In terms of coastal defense, Iran has recently acquired a number of surface-launched fixed and mobile anti-ship missiles like the Ghased-1 and Nasr-1 (most likely bought from China). In conventional military operations, these missiles could be used in addition to the anti-submarine torpedoes and Noor C-802 surface-to-surface missiles deployed on newly built frigates like the Jamaran. [1]
Meanwhile, the presence of mines also poses a major threat to the US Navy, which is busy, along with British naval forces, in a constant minesweeping mission throughout the Gulf. [2] The target of such coastal missile and mine operations would most likely include oil rigs, oil tankers, commercial ships (from Arab states in the Gulf) and other possible soft targets with the objective of disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
In terms of asymmetrical warfare, the IRGCN would lead the charge in operations in the strait. This aspect of Iranian naval warfare entails the highest risk for military conflict, since the IRGCN is typically undisciplined in its organizational and tactical operations.
The unruly tactics of the Revolutionary Guards in the Strait of Hormuz could increase the possibility of misinterpretation and miscalculation on both sides, as was the case with the near confrontation of Iranian fast boats and a flotilla of American naval forces in early 2008. [3]
In many ways, the 2008 introduction of 74 domestically built missile boats (based on the North Korean Peykaap ISP-16 model), effectively used in war exercises, indicates Iran is turning toward reliance on asymmetrical tactics. These missile boats can be the deadliest form of naval warfare against US forces, particularly if used in unconventional operations such as suicide attacks.
In spite of structural shortcomings and its role as the smallest branch of Iran's armed forces, the Islamic Republic's navy and particularly the IRGCN remain a substantial threat to US forces in the Persian Gulf. With the new wave of sanctions and US President Barack Obama indicating that Iran may not be included in Washington's new commitment not to attack non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons, the Islamic Republic is becoming considerably alarmed by the prospect of war.
These fears are making Iran more aggressive in its military policy in the Persian Gulf, with a possible increase in the presence of the IRGCN in the Strait of Hormuz in the months to come. In light of the element of miscalculation, the prospect looms large of a military conflict in a vital maritime region, with consequences for economic security on a global scale.